We study the impact of corporate governance frictions on growth in an economy where growth is driven both by the foundation of …rms that o¤er new products and by the in-house investment of incumbent …rms. Managers can engage in tunnelling and empire building activities at the expense of …rms' shareholders. Firm founders can monitor managers on behalf of all shareholders, but can shirk on their monitoring, damaging minority shareholders. We investigate the e¤ects of these con ‡icts among …rms'stakeholders and …nanciers on both the entry of new …rms and the investment of existing …rms. The analysis also characterizes conditions under which the e¤ects of corporate governance frictions on growth boost or reduce welfare.
Introduction
Financial markets and corporate governance are increasingly viewed as major determinants of the long-run performance of industrialized and emerging economies. Several scholars argue that crosscountry di¤erences in growth and productivity can be attributed to a signi…cant extent to di¤erences in corporate governance, including the rules governing con ‡icts among shareholders and between shareholders and managers (Bloom et al., 2012) . Recent empirical studies con…rm the importance of corporate governance in the growth process (see, e.g., De Nicolo', Laeven, Ueda, 2008). The OECD (2012) summarizes this body of evidence by arguing that "corporate governance exerts a strong in ‡uence on resource allocation. It impacts upon innovative activity and entrepreneurship. Better corporate governance, therefore, both within OECD and non-OECD countries should manifest itself in enhanced corporate performance and can lead to higher economic growth."
In contrast with this broad consensus about its relevance, there is little consensus about the channels through which corporate governance a¤ects growth. On the one hand, the advocates of the "rule of law" maintain that economies characterized by stronger protection of minority shareholders and managerial discipline enjoy more intense competition and better growth performance. According to this view, the inability of some emerging economies to ameliorate governance problems hinders their e¤orts to catch up with advanced economies. On the other hand, especially in middle-income countries, governments have often pursued …nancial and corporate policies that have instead accommodated the informational opacity of businesses in …nancial markets as well as managers'empire building attitudes. The experience of business groups -ubiquitous in middle-income countries -is paradigmatic in this respect. Many emerging countries have enacted policies that have protected business groups, allowing them to disclose limited information to …nancial markets. A side consequence has been that managers of large group a¢ liates have been able to engage in tunneling activities, diverting resources especially at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition, in the belief that large businesses would better compete in global markets, governments have often favored the appointment of managers with empire building attitudes. The advocates of these policies stress that large business group a¢ liates have turned out to be the engines of the rapid growth of several countries, such as Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. 1 By contrast, their opponents maintain that these policies have forestalled competition and inhibited entrepreneurship. The impact on economic growth and the overall welfare consequences thus remain ambiguous a priori (see, e.g., Khanna, 2000 , and Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005, for a discussion).
Regardless of which view one endorses, the above discussion implies that, to understand the e¤ects of …nancial and corporate governance frictions on the long-run performance of an economy, one needs to investigate how such frictions in ‡uence both entrepreneurship, that is, the ease with which new …rms can enter product markets, and the speed at which incumbent …rms grow. Indeed, scholars document the profound e¤ects that corporate reforms have had on the market structure of various countries in recent decades, in ‡uencing the ease with which …rms break into new markets (see, e.g., Fulghieri and Suominen, 2013, and Hyytinen, Kuosa and Takalo, 2002) . And there is also established evidence that governance frictions can distort the investment decisions of incumbent …rms (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013; Manso, 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005) . 2 Clearly, analyzing how corporate governance shapes the entry of new …rms and the growth of incumbent ones can also yield far-reaching insights for the current policy debate. The Great Recession has led to calls for …nancial and corporate reforms. Reforms that reduce uncertainty and boost the investments of incumbent …rms may entail a cost in terms of more rigidity in the entry of new …rms and, hence, in the market structure (Economist, 2012). 1 Several empirical studies …nd that business groups exhibit higher growth rates than normal (see, e.g., Campbell and Keys, 2002, and Choi and Cowing, 1999) . The empirical results about their relative pro…tability are instead generally ambiguous (see, e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000, and Bertrand, Metha and Mullainathan, 2002) . 2 There is also a vast literature, started by Schumpeter, that maintains that when investigating technological change, one should di¤erentiate between the introduction of radically new products and technologies (radical innovations) and the process of continuous improvement of existing products and technologies (incremental innovation). Schumpeter also argued that …nancial markets can have a key role in shaping both margins of innovation and their interaction.
This paper takes a step towards addressing these issues. We embed imperfect corporate governance in a model economy where endogenous growth is driven both by the foundation of new …rms that o¤er new products (the "extensive margin" of innovation) and by the improvement in the quality of the products o¤ered by existing …rms (the "intensive margin" of innovation). The economy is populated by households, …rm founders, and managers. Firm founders gather funds from households to start up new …rms and introduce new varieties of intermediate goods. Managers are in charge of production decisions and of investment decisions concerning the quality improvement of existing products. The critical feature of our economy consists of the presence of …nancial frictions, in the form of con ‡icts between managers and shareholders and between majority shareholders (…rms founders) and minority shareholders (households). We model frictions taking a leaf from the …nance literature, especially Nikolov and Whited (2013) . We let managers and …rm founders (majority shareholders) engage in moral hazard. In particular, as in Nikolov and Whited (2013) , managers can engage in tunneling activities (divert resources) and empire building (pursue private bene…ts tied to …rm size). Firm founders can monitor managers on behalf of all shareholders to mitigate managers'moral hazard. However, they can shirk on their monitoring role, putting little e¤ort in monitoring managers. The incentive of majority shareholders to monitor managers depends on the equity stake they retain in …rms: to induce monitoring, dispersed …nanciers (households) need to surrender part of the surplus to founders. Thus, …rm founders extract rents from minority shareholders. This way of modelling frictions not only replicates prior studies but also matches extant evidence on the problems surrounding large businesses in middle-income countries.
We examine how corporate governance frictions a¤ect the intensive and the extensive margin of endogenous growth as well as their interaction. The analysis reveals that both empire building and tunnelling activities exert an upward pressure on the size of …rms and, on the transition path, slow down the rate of entry of new …rms. This, in turn, implies that governance frictions depress the product variety. On the other hand, governance frictions boost the intensive margin of growth, increasing the rate at which incumbent …rms invest in the improvement of the quality of existing products. While this comparison should not be stretched, notably these results closely match the historical experience of large business group a¢ liates in middle-income countries. For instance, prior static partial equilibrium studies suggest that the agency costs structure of Korean chaebol …rms prompted them to pursue faster growth (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 1999; Lee, 2000) .
Based on these results, the net welfare impact of an increase in governance frictions is ambiguous a priori: the impact trades o¤ the welfare-worsening e¤ect due to the increase in market concentration with the welfare-enhancing e¤ect due to faster growth of incumbent …rms. To better grasp this trade-o¤, consider an increase in the severity of the tunnelling problem, such that managers can divert more resources from …rms. This shrinks the returns that can be pledged to dispersed …nanciers (households), deterring …rm entry. In equilibrium, this implies that …rms' size grows larger, which in turn stimulates the investment in quality of incumbent …rms. Interestingly, when we calibrate corporate governance parameters in line with the empirical …ndings of Nikolov and Whited (2013) , we obtain that the welfare bene…t associated with the faster growth of incumbent …rms tends to outweigh the welfare cost associated with the lower dynamism on the entry margin. However, for higher values of
The analysis further reveals rich interactions between the two types of governance frictions, identifying conditions under which the frictions on the two margins of growth reinforce or mitigate each other. There is a growing literature on the role of …nancial markets in the growth process. Yet, little is known about the role of corporate governance frictions, especially when we take the market structure of the economy into account. Despite early attempts and calls for more research, more notably in Aghion and Howitt (1998) , theoretical work on how corporate governance a¤ects growth has lagged behind the policy-oriented debate. With this paper, we hope to make a …rst step toward …lling the gap.
We model growth borrowing from ideas that researchers have used over the last twenty years to extend the domain of applicability of the original models of endogenous growth to include endogenous market structure and to solve some empirical di¢ culties exhibited by the early models. On the …rst point, see the discussions in Peretto (1996 Peretto ( , 1999 ) and the recent survey by Etro (2009) . On the second point, as is well known, …rst-generation endogenous growth models feature a positive relation between aggregate market size and growth that results in a positive relation between the scale of aggregate economic activity and the growth rate of income per capita. Several contributions proposed solutions based on product proliferation: Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 1999 , Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) , Young (1998) , and Howitt (1999) . This version of Schumpeterian theory has recently received empirical support in Ha and Howitt (2007), Laincz and Peretto (2006) , Sedgley (2006) , Madsen (2008) and Ulku (2007) . 3 The main strength of the latest vintage of Schumpeterian models is that they sterilize the scale e¤ect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. This approach allows one to introduce population growth and elastic labor supply without generating counterfactual behavior of the growth rate. It also implies that fundamentals and policy variables that work through the size of the aggregate market have no growth e¤ects, whereas fundamentals and policy variables that reallocate resources between vertical (quality/productivity) and horizontal (variety) innovation do have long-run growth e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the dynamics of the economy while Section 4 solves for the steady state. In Section 5, we investigate the response of the economy to shocks in the intensity of corporate governance frictions. Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the model and details about the numerical experiments are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
The economy is closed. There is a …nal good and a continuum of non-durable intermediate goods.
To keep things simple, there is no physical capital. All variables are functions of (continuous) time but to simplify the notation we omit the time argument unless necessary to avoid confusion.
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of mass L = L 0 e t , L 0 1. A household supplies labor and trades assets in competitive markets. A household can also provide managerial services or act as a …rm founder. The representative household has preferences
where t is the point in time when the household makes decisions, is the individual discount rate, and C is consumption. Since each household is endowed with one unit of time, L is the total endowment of labor. Each household supplies labor inelastically and thus faces the ‡ow budget constraint
where A is assets holding, r is the rate of return on assets and w is the wage. The term R denotes the income that the household receives from the provision of managerial services or from the activity of …rm inception. The intertemporal consumption plan that maximizes (1) subject to (2) consists of the Euler equation r = + _ C=C;
the budget constraint (2) and the usual boundary conditions. 
Final producers
where N is the mass of intermediate goods, X i is the quantity of intermediate good i, and L is labor. Given the inelastic labor supply of the household and the one-sector structure of the model, labor market clearing yields that employment in the …nal sector is equal to population size. Quality is the ability of a good to raise the productivity of the other factors: the contribution of good i depends on its own quality, Z i , and on the average quality, Z = R N 0 (Z j =N ) dj, of intermediate goods. Social returns to quality are equal to 1. The parameter measures instead social returns to variety. The …rst-order conditions for the pro…t maximization problem of the …nal producer yield that each intermediate producer faces the demand curve
where P i is the price of intermediate good i. The …rst-order conditions then yield that the …nal producer pays total compensation
to intermediate goods and labor suppliers, respectively. 
Intermediate producers
where I i is investment in quality, in units of …nal good. Using (5), the …rm's gross pro…t (i.e., the pro…t before investment expenditure) is
It is useful to consider the problem of an intermediate …rm in a benchmark economy without …nancial and governance frictions. At time t, absent such frictions, the intermediate …rm would choose for s 2 [t; 1) paths of the product's price, P i (s) and investment, I i (s), so to maximize
subject to (7) and (8), and taking the paths of the interest rate, r (s), and of average quality, Z (s), as given. Next, we need to specify the process of formation of intermediate …rms. At time t, a household member who wants to found a new …rm has to sink X (t) units of …nal good. Because of this sunk cost, the new …rm cannot supply an existing good in Bertrand competition with the incumbent monopolist but must introduce a new good that expands product variety. New …rms enter at the average quality level, and therefore at average size (this simplifying assumption preserves symmetry of equilibrium at all times). We let a founder (henceforth, also majority shareholder) …nance a share 1 of the entry cost X (t) and borrow the funds to cover the remaining portion of the entry cost from other household members (henceforth, also minority shareholders).
Financial and governance frictions
We depart from a frictionless environment by allowing for …nancial and governance frictions. The goal of our analysis is to study how such frictions a¤ect economic growth by in ‡uencing …rms' production and investment decisions as well as market structure. Speci…cally, we are interested in capturing con ‡icts of interest between managers and shareholders on one side and between large (majority) and dispersed (minority) shareholders on the other side. To this end, we posit that the investment and production decisions of each intermediate …rm are made by a manager who maximizes his own objective function, which needs not be aligned with the objective function of the shareholders of the …rm. The decisions of a manager can be monitored by the founder ("majority shareholder") of the intermediate …rm. However, we posit that, in turn, the …rm founder cannot commit vis-à-vis the households providing the funds for setting up the …rm (dispersed …nanciers or "minority shareholders"). As detailed below, we are interested in capturing two types of frictions: a "tunnelling" problem, such that managers and majority shareholders can siphon o¤ resources from intermediate good …rms; and an "empire building" problem such that managers derive private bene…ts from expanding the size of …rms. These are the two frictions considered by Nikolov and Whited (2013) 
Managers'problem
Let the net pro…t generated by an intermediate …rm be
Following the corporate governance literature (see, e.g., Nikolov and Whited, 2013), we let the compensation package of a manager consist of two components: a share of the …rm's pro…ts and a portion of pro…ts he diverts from the …rm (tunneling). Formally, the manager owns a share, m i 0, of the company and steals a fraction i (M i ; S i ) of the net pro…t N i , where S i is the manager's e¤ort in tunneling activities and M i is the e¤ort of the …rm's founder in monitoring the manager. We assume
As in Nikolov and Whited (2013) , on top of the con ‡icts with shareholders stemming from his tunneling activity, the manager's objectives can also depart from the shareholders'objectives due to an innate taste of the manager for building empires. We model such an empire building motive by letting the manager have a preference for the …rm's gross volume of earnings. In particular, we write the manager's utility ‡ow as
utility from gross earnings : (11) Thus, a manager derives an extra utility from the ‡ow of gross earnings P i X i (here, proxying for the …rm's size), irrespective of the costs sustained. 4 > 0 is a parameter re ‡ecting the intensity of the empire building motive.
At time t, given the path of monitoring of the founder, M i (s) ; and the path of his shareholding, m i (s) ; for s 2 [t; 1), the manager chooses the paths
This expression makes explicit that the objective of the manager is not the maximization of the value e V i (t) de…ned in equation (9) above. By contrast, he forms the following Hamiltonian
where q i is the shadow value of the marginal increase in quality. The …rst-order conditions with respect to P i , I i , Z i and S i are (dropping the s index of calendar time for simplicity):
A useful property of this system of conditions is that the …rst three can be solved for given S i (the manager's tunneling e¤ort), while the fourth yields the optimal decision about S i given the value of the net pro…t N i generated by the triple P i , I i , Z i . In other words, in our setup the decisions about P i , I i , Z i and S i are separable. The triple P i , I i , Z i drives the evolution of the net pro…t, the decision about S i drives the evolution of the share of net pro…t that the manager diverts.
In what follows, to compress notation, it is useful to de…ne
The …rst-order condition with respect to P i yields
This condition highlights the incentive that the manager has to underprice the intermediate good relative to the frictionless monopoly value 1= in order to increase the size of the …rm. Combining this result with the conditions for I i and Z i (and anticipating that i is constant), we obtain an expression that describes the rate of return to investment in quality:
This expression makes clear the distortion in the quality investment due to the manager's preference for current gross earnings. This distortion results in a gross pro…t margin (P i M C) =M C = (P i 1) that is smaller than the frictionless one, 1 1 . 5 To ensure that the pricing decision is economically meaningful, we impose the restriction (1 + ) < 1.
The …rst-order condition for S i says that the manager sets the marginal bene…t of his tunneling e¤ort equal to its marginal cost,
The marginal bene…t is given by the marginal increase in the net pro…t that the manager diverts from the share 1 m i that the ownership structure allocates to the shareholders. This says that a higher share m i in the …rm discourages managerial moral hazard because the manager would merely make costly e¤ort to steal from himself. Thus, m i is a …rst tool through which the manager's objectives can be better aligned with shareholders'objectives.
Founders'problem
The founder of an intermediate …rm can monitor and mitigate the misbehavior (tunneling) of the …rm's manager. 6 To capture con ‡icts between majority and minority shareholders, we posit that the founder maximizes his own expected utility, rather than the total value of the …rm. Put di¤erently, majority shareholders cannot commit to a given level of monitoring but must be provided with incentives to monitor through the participation to the pro…ts of the …rms. We assume that the cost of monitoring is c M (M i ) N i in units of …nal good and the monitoring cost function c M (M i ) has the same properties as c S (S i ). At time t, given the paths S i (s), P i (s), I i (s) and f i (s) for s 2 [t; 1), the founder chooses the path of monitoring
The …rst-order condition with respect to M i is
which becomes
This conveys a similar intuition as the condition for the manager. The share f i of equity in the hands of the founder determines the extent to which the founder makes an e¤ort to monitor and prevent the manager's tunneling.
Minority shareholders'problem
We think of (19) and (20) as reaction functions that at time s t yield a Nash equilibrium
as the solution of the pair of equations (dropping the s index of calendar time for simplicity)
Given the assumptions on the function i (M i ; S i ), these two equations yield a pair (M i ; S i ) that depends on the equity shares of manager and founder m i , f i . We now turn to the decisions of the …nanciers (dispersed shareholders) at the foundation stage of a …rm. The …nanciers'only decision is about the paths m i (s) and f i (s) of the ownership shares to be allocated to the manager and to the founder in order to induce the behavior that maximizes the value of their stake in the …rm. 7 We consider an arrangement whereby the shares are chosen at the foundation time, t, and are not altered afterwards. This implies that M i (s) and S i (s) are constant for all s t. The …nanciers'objective is to maximize
subject to the participation constraint
where on the right-hand side V i (t) is the value of the new …rm (speci…ed below) and
is the ownership share that the contract allocates to the dispersed …nanciers. On the left-hand side X (t) is the technological cost of entry that the …nanciers fund, and is the fraction paid by the shareholders. The remaining fraction of the cost (1 ) is paid by the monitor agent, who, in virtue of his role, is able to appropriate a share f of the value of the …rm. The monitor agents's participation constraint is
where (t) are the present and future monitoring costs incurred privately by the …nancier. The value of the …rm is
We again see the discrepancy between the objective of the …nanciers and that of the manager. Since the …nanciers take the path
as given, and thus take the whole integral on the right-hand side as given, the problem reduces to optimizing the function with respect to the quotas m i and f i . The managers tunnel the present and future resources stripped from the intermediate producer in an entity to which we will refer as "shell" company. For simplicity, we assume that all tunneling costs are privately incurred by the manager. Because the manager expects to extract a constant fraction 0 i < 1 of the net pro…t of the …rm, the value of the shell is
Equity shares in intermediate …rms are the only assets of this economy. Therefore, the overall wealth of the households at time t equals
The following example provides analytical results on the mechanism just discussed.
Then,
; 2 (0; 1) ;
Proof. See the Appendix.
These expressions yield sensible comparative statics with respect to the fundamentals. For example, an increase in the cost of stealing S reduces f i and raises m i .
The entry decision
Because anybody can start up a new …rm, the participation constraint (21) holds as an equality. The free-entry condition thus reads
From the previous analysis, f i (t) and m i (t) satisfy the Nash equilibrium (f ; m ). We thus can write
which is equal across all new …rms and is time-invariant. According to this expression, the governance frictions that induce the dispersed …nanciers to surrender the shares f and m to the founder and the manager to preserve incentives raise the entry cost that the …nanciers face for given value of the …rm to be created. Taking logs and time derivatives of the free-entry condition and of equation (9), and imposing symmetry, yields
where
This expression shows that the return to entry -i.e., the return to setting up new corporate entities subject to the governance frictions discussed above -is given by the dividend price ratio plus capital gains/losses, with the addition of a "leakage" term. This term captures the two channels through which the tunneling distortion manifests itself. The …rst channel is direct: the household owns only a fraction 1 f m of the …rm. The second channel is indirect: given ownership structure 1 f m , f and m , the manager and the founder make stealing and monitoring decisions that result in a share (f ; m ) of the net pro…ts being diverted from dividend distribution to the manager's pockets. Recall that, in turn, the net pro…t N is in ‡uenced by the empire building distortion.
The economy' s dynamics
This section studies the economy's allocation of …nal output Y to consumption and production of intermediate goods and derives the reduced-form representation of the resulting equilibrium dynamics.
Structure of the equilibrium
Intermediate producers receive N P X = Y from the …nal producer. Imposing symmetry in the production function (4) and using this result to eliminate X yields
The de…nition of gross pro…t (8) and equations (18) and (22) show that the returns to innovation and to entry depend on the quality-adjusted gross cash ‡ow of the …rm (P 1) X=Z -i.e., revenues minus variable production costs, all scaled by quality -since this is the appropriate measure of pro…tability for …rms that spread …xed costs, including the cost of developing quality-improving innovations, over their volume of sales. Scaling by quality is required to make variables stationary in steady state. Using equation (24), we thus write both returns as functions of
To isolate the role of the price decision from the other determinants of the quality-adjusted cash ‡ow, we de…ne x L=N 1 and use it as our state variable. We also keep P to denote the price in order to emphasize the channel through which corporate governance frictions due to empire building work their way through the economy. Recall that the manager's price decision is P = 1= (1 + ); see equation (17) . Substitution of expression (25) in (18) and (22) yields the following expressions for the returns to innovation and to entry:
These two equations show that …rm-level decisions depend on the quality-adjusted gross cash ‡ow, which is increasing in labor use in the downstream …nal sector (since production of …nal goods drives the demand for intermediate goods) and decreasing in the mass of …rms. It should be clear, however, that from the viewpoint of the managers of incumbent …rms and of the founders of new …rms the critical market size variable is total expenditure on intermediate goods, Y ; the terms L and N enter the calculation of the returns once we want to trace the general equilibrium determinants of Y . The two equations reveal that the returns to investment and to entry are critically in ‡uenced by the corporate governance frictions captured by and P = 1= (1 + ). Speci…cally, the empire building problem ( ) reduces the quality-adjusted gross pro…t margin (P 1) X=Z and thereby reduces both the return to in-house quality innovation (26) and the return to entry (27) . We have already discussed the …rst result; the second follows from the fact that in addition to reducing the quality-adjusted gross pro…t margin, the decision to price low enlarges the volume of production X and thus raises the cost of entry. On the other hand, the return to entry is decreasing in the severity of the tunneling problem ( ): with no tunnelling we have = 1, with tunnelling < 1.
Dynamics
The model has the desirable feature that it reduces to a single di¤erential equation in the state variable x. The following propositions characterize the dynamics it produces. We begin with a useful result on the consumption ‡ow as a function of x.
Proposition 2 Let c C=Y be the economy's consumption ratio. Let z _ Z=Z and n _ N =N be the rates of quality and variety innovation, respectively. In equilibrium, c = 8 > < > :
This result identi…es two regimes. In one, x is too small and there is no entry, in which case the consumption ratio is increasing in x because …rms earn escalating rents (uncontested by entrants) from the growing size of the market (recall that we postulate population growth). Such rents are distributed to the shareholders who consume them. In the other regime, x is su¢ ciently high and there is entry, in which case the rents are capped and the consumption ratio is constant. This structure yields a closed-form solution for the dynamics of the model.
Proposition 3 Assume:
There exists a …nite threshold …rm size
that triggers investment in variety innovation (entry) and a …nite threshold
that triggers investment in quality innovation. The ordering of the thresholds is x N < x Z . In equilibrium, the rates of quality and variety innovation are:
Firm size obeys the di¤ erential equation
Assumptions (29)- (31) are technical conditions that we impose to focus on the model's equilibrium con…guration that yields the most interesting results. Assumption (29) says that the threshold for entry x N is …nite. Assumption (30) says that when the economy crosses the threshold x N , and activates variety innovation, quality innovation is not yet pro…table and that therefore it takes additional growth of our proxy for …rm size x to activate it. In other words, the assumption says that x N < x Z . Assumption (31) says that when the economy crosses the threshold x Z the no-arbitrage condition that returns be equalized if both quality and variety R&D are to take place identi…es a stable Nash equilibrium (see the proof of the Proposition for details). Figure 1 illustrates the rates of innovation as functions of x. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of x while Proposition 4 states the formal result, including the condition that ensures that the economy does cross the threshold x Z .
Proposition 4 Assume
There exists a unique equilibrium trajectory: given initial condition x 0 the economy converges to the steady state x . For x x N < x Z , we have _ x=x = and therefore the economy crosses the threshold for entry in …nite time in light of assumption (29) that guarantees that x N is …nite. For x N < x < x Z we have, after rearranging terms,
Therefore, the economy crosses the threshold for quality innovation in …nite time since x is still growing at x = x Z in light of assumption (35) . Note that the threshold x Z is always …nite so that, given population growth, the economy can fail to cross it only if there is premature market saturation due to entry. 8 
The steady state
We now turn to the characterization of the steady state. We use the saving behavior of the household r = + 1 + z ;
and manipulate the returns to quality investment and to entry to obtain:
The …rst curve, which we call the corporate innovation (CI) locus, describes the steady-state rate of vertical innovation that incumbents generate given the value of x that they expect to hold in equilibrium. The second curve, that we call the entrepreneurial locus (EI), describes the steadystate value of x that entrants generate -recall that x L=N 1 -given the value of the growth rate of quality that they expect in the post-entry equilibrium. The steady state is the intersection of these two curves in the (x; z) space. After some algebra, we obtain: 9
(1 ) (P 1) 8 The intuition behind these dynamics is that we have chosen a parameters' con…guration such that the qualityadjusted gross pro…tability of …rms, (P 1) X=Z, rises throughout the range [ ; xZ ]. Consequently, the dissipation of pro…tability due to entry gains su¢ cient force to induce convergence to a constant value of x only in the region where …rms have already activated their in-house quality-improving operations. 9 Existence and stability of this steady state requires the intercept condition that EI curve starts out below the CI curve and the the slope condition that EI curve is steeper than CI curve. Together they say that intersection exists with EI line cutting CI line from below. The restrictions on the parameters that guarantee this con…guration are those, stated in Propositions 3-4, that yield the global stability of the economy's GE dynamics.
(1 ) (P 1)
Associated to these, we have variety growth,
Recall also that P = 1= (1 + ). Figure 3 shows the comparative statics e¤ects of tunnelling. Recall that re ‡ects the share of the net pro…t that the minority shareholders retain in equilibrium once we account for the portion surrendered to the manager and to the founder. The frictionless economy features = 1; the economy with tunnelling has < 1. The EI locus is increasing in , that is, for given x a lower reduces the innovation rate consistent with entrepreneurs' entry decisions. Intuitively, expenditures on in-house innovation must drop to compensate for the drop in the share of pro…ts that can be appropriated by the …nanciers. On the other hand, the tunneling friction does not a¤ect the CI locus, because it equally erodes returns and costs of investment in in-house innovation. Consider then a shock to the severity of the tunneling problem in the form of a reduction in the cost faced by managers when diverting resources. The drop in makes the EI locus shift down. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of the shock: both steady-state …rm size and steady-state innovation growth rise. Thus, an increase in the severity of the tunneling problem promotes growth and makes the industry structure more concentrated in the sense that product variety falls. 10 Figure 3: The steady-state e¤ect of a worsening of governance frictions that results in a lower 1 0 The intuition is that since entry more costly the …nancial market reallocates resources to existing …rms.
Next, we study the comparative statics e¤ects of empire building. A shock to pushes both the EI and CI loci down because by construction the empire building distortion lowers the qualityadjusted gross pro…t margin (P 1) X=Z and raises the cost of entry X. Intuitively, both the rate of return to entry and to in-house innovation fall because managers'price decisions are more distorted. Thus, for given x the expenditure on in-house innovation consistent with equalization of each type of investment to the reservation rate of return of savers must fall. Since both loci shift down, we have a potentially ambiguous e¤ect. However, our algebra reveals that the increase in unambiguously lowers the in-house innovation rate z and thus must reduce our measure of …rm size x; see Figure 4 for an illustration. As a result of the shock, therefore, the industry structure becomes more concentrated because that is what is required to have …rms that grow faster through in-house innovation. 
GDP and welfare
To complete the characterization of the model, we examine the e¤ects of corporate governance frictions on GDP and welfare. Let G denote the GDP of this economy. Subtracting the cost of intermediate production from the value of …nal production and using (25) yields
where P = 1= (1 + ) . The term in brackets is increasing in X, and therefore in x, because the unit cost of production of the typical intermediate …rm falls as its scale of operation rises. GDP per capita equals
This expression says that GDP per capita rises with e¢ ciency (…rms' average scale) and with technology (product variety and average quality). It also identi…es the channels through which pricing decisions operate. The contrasting e¤ects of the deviation from the pro…t maximizing price on total demand for intermediates and …rm size result in GDP per capita being hump-shaped in . In steady state the growth rate of …nal output and GDP per capita is
To carry out the analysis of welfare, we start with the following result.
Proposition 5 Consider the transition path of an economy that starts at time 0 with initial condition x 0 > x Z and converges to x . Under the approximation = P 
where (1 ) (1 ) (P 1) + 1 :
Therefore the explicit solution for the economy's path is
At time t 0, the utility ‡ow associated to this path
Substituting in the welfare functional and integrating yields
According to this proposition, the welfare associated to the transition to the steady state x from initial condition x 0 has three components: the intercept (or initial consumption or level e¤ect) component, the steady-state growth component, and the transitional component. The expression for U assigns weight 1= ( ) to the intercept component, weight 1= ( ) 2 to the steady-state component, and weight
to the transitional component. The transitional component captures a key channel at work in this model. Consider an increase of the tunnelling or of the empire building problem that triggers a consolidation of the industry, so that over time it converges to larger …rms that grow faster, i.e., consider a transition with x > x 0 . While such consolidation entails an acceleration of quality growth, it also entails a slowdown of entry and thus a loss of product variety relative to the baseline path. To see it, recall that
so that throughout the transition to the higher x the rate of entry falls below the rate of population growth. In other words, the model exhibits a dynamic quality/variety trade-o¤ that manifests itself as a growth/variety trade-o¤. The key implication of this trade-o¤ is that when x rises, the bene…t of faster quality growth has to be weighed against the cost of the foregone product variety required to achieve the larger …rm size that supports the faster quality growth. Some intuitive properties of this calculation are straightforward. First, holding constant the magnitude of the changes @z =@ > 0 and @x =@ > 0, the faster the transition, the more weight we put on the steady state and the more we tend to …nd a positive welfare e¤ect of . In contrast, if the transition is very slow and the economy spends a lot of time out of steady state, we put more weight on the welfare cost of higher and we tend to …nd a welfare loss. Given these considerations, it should be clear that it is relatively easy to obtain a hump-shaped relation between and U : starting from = 0, the introduction of a small deviation from the pro…t-maximizing price of intermediate goods yields a consolidation of the industry that produces faster growth su¢ cient to compensate for the foregone variety. But at some point, as grows, the deviation from the pro…t-maximizing price yields a welfare loss because the gain in faster growth does not compensate for the foregone variety breadth.
Welfare: a more re…ned exercise
In this section, we compute analytically how a variation in a¤ects households' welfare. The starting point is the value of the households' welfare described in Proposition (5). Let U 0 be welfare when the economy is in a steady state with x = x 0 and z = z 0 . Let also the initial values of and P be = 0 and P 0 = 1 (1+ 0 ) . Let the new values of and P be 1 and P 1 , and the new steady state values of x and z be x 1 and z 1 . Imagine that 1 < 0 so that the empire building distortion becomes less severe. The di¤erence between the new and the old level of utility is
for j = 0; 1 and
The …rst term, log(
), is negative because consumption drops as intermediate prices rise. The second term captures the long-run e¤ect of the friction on innovation and thereby on the growth rates of output and consumption. As discussed with the graphical steady-state analysis, the innovation rate declines because in the long run …rms are smaller in an economy with a more modest friction, and therefore invest less in innovation. Finally, the third term is always positive because …rms are smaller, 
Experiments
We conduct experiments to investigate the dynamic adjustment of the economy when it is hit by shocks to corporate governance frictions. All the shocks are permanent and are perceived as such. For simplicity, we also assume they are not anticipated. Table 1 displays the chosen parameterization of the baseline economy. We rely on prior literature to calibrate most of the parameters. We set the discount rate = 3:5% and the population growth rate = 1%. The entry cost and the operating cost parameters, and , govern the long run output growth. We set = 1 and choose to target a 2% growth rate, as suggested by the U.S. experience. The externality We choose the parameters re ‡ecting the corporate governance frictions following Nikolov and Whited (2013). Their estimates suggest tunneling ( ) and empire-building ( ) parameters in the order of 0.1 and 0.2 percent, respectively. Because in our model is endogenous, it is compatible with di¤erent combination of moral hazard parameters (i.e., the parameters capturing monitoring and tunneling costs). To reduce the degrees of freedom in choosing these parameters, we target an equity share of the managers, m, below 10 percent, in line with what found by Nikolov and Whited (2013).
Shocks
The shocks we consider have a similar ‡avor as those discussed in the analysis of the steady state. Here, however, we follow the adjustment process of an economy that is hit by a shock when it is in steady state and moves to the new one. The values of the baseline parameter values are in Table  (1) . We posit that when it is hit by a shock the economy is in the steady state characterized in Table ( 2): the interest rate is 5.5%, the innovation rate is 1.75%, and the output growth rate is 2%. In each experiment, we change only one parameter. Table ( 3) shows the long-run variations caused by the shock to a selected number of macroeconomic variables.
First, consider the e¤ect of an elimination of the empire building friction, . It is easier to interpret the dynamic responses to the shock by keeping in mind two aspects of the frictionless economy. First, the presence of monopolistic power generates a classic static ine¢ ciency that translates into a sub-optimal level of production. Second, an incumbent intermediate …rm can appropriate only a fraction of its own investment in quality innovation, while bene…ting from knowledge developed by other …rms. Therefore, the decentralized solution implies levels of investment in quality innovation below those that would be chosen by a social planner. In other words, the frictionless economy is hardly a …rst best environment. Fig. (5) plots the impulse responses (dashed-lines) to a permanent drop of from 0.1% to zero. The immediate response to the shock is a reduction of the quantity produced, obtained via an increase of the monopolistic price. Because the price is brought to the optimal monopolistic level, pro…ts expand. This is a positive development not only from the perspective of the incumbent …rms but also from the point of view of potential entrants. Indeed, lured by the higher pro…ts, more entrepreneurs set up …rms leading to an expansion of the array of intermediate goods, which boosts the productivity of the …nal good sector. The entry e¤ect can indeed be strong enough to displace resources that incumbent …rms would have allocated to in-house investment in an economy a¤ected by empire building. The relatively modest initial contraction of in-house investment is followed by a slow century-long decline. The greater intensity with which new …rms ‡ock in not only causes a reduction of …rms' average size, but indirectly prompts …rms to slow down their investment in quality innovation. To put it di¤erently, the long-run drop of in-house investment is the consequence of the acceleration in …rm entry.
The …gure shows an undershooting phenomenon in the consumption-GDP ratio. Because the frictionless economy has to sustain a relatively greater number of …rms, each of which comes with an operating cost, there is a larger gap between gross output and the GDP. The long-run consumption-output ratio also declines but not to the point of compensating the increased gap between net output and GDP. Nonetheless, because forward-looking households immediately adjust on the new long-run lower consumption-output ratio, whereas the mass of …rms adjusts gradually, the consumption-GDP ratio drops in the long run.
Following the discussion of section (4.3) we decompose the steady state and the transition welfare e¤ects of the shock. The elimination of the friction has the expected negative long-run e¤ect due to the decline of the innovation rate, but also brings bene…ts along the transition thanks to the more intense entry of new …rms. In Figure (5 ) the change in the long-run welfare component induced by the shock is calculated by taking the di¤erence between the instantaneous discounted utilities of the original and the shocked economy when both are on their long run path. Because the shock causes a long-run decline in the per capita output growth rate, this part of the welfare change is necessarily negative. Conversely, the transitional component is positive for the most part, because it re ‡ects the bene…ts of a greater variety of intermediate goods. However, notice that when the shock hits the economy, the transitional welfare component drops temporarily: the elimination of the friction means that every intermediate good is sold at a higher price. In the current simulation, the long-term component prevails. The positive transitional e¤ect prevails, however, when the original economy features an important empire building distortion. This scenario is illustrated in Figure (7) .
We also conducted experiments in which the empire building utility is included in the households'welfare. The per capita welfare function we considered is:
where U is de…ned in (1) and
Using the property N P X = Y and the consumption-output ratio, c de…ned in (28), we obtain
In the second experiment, we alter the tunneling distortion by enhancing the e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology, M . To better compare the quantitative e¤ects of the shock with those of the previous shock, we reduce the monitoring cost so as to obtain the same long-run decline of the interest rate and of the output growth rate (0.01%). The second row of Table  ( 3) displays the long-run variations of other indicators. By construction, some of the long-run outcomes of this experiment are qualitatively similar to those associated with the removal of the empire-building friction. An improvement of the tunneling e¤ect, brought about by an improvement of the monitoring technique or by greater barriers in stealing, leads to faster entry and to a gradual of the relative demand share faced by each …rm. This e¤ect inevitably reduces …rms' incentives to innovate. In the long run the economy will converge to an equilibrium with more …rms of smaller size that devote a relatively smaller share of their sales to innovation. These dynamics are illustrated in Fig. (7) when the shock a¤ects the monitoring technology.
The long-run and the transitional components of the welfare change roughly balance each other. The decline of the long-run component of welfare is still caused by the drop of the innovation rate. The source of the short-run bene…ts is the greater variety of intermediate goods. In contrast with the previous experiment, the tunneling distortion does not alter directly the static ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic power; therefore, the transitional component of the welfare change is always positive. Changes in the cost of stealing and of monitoring ( S and M ) or in the ease of stealing, have similar qualitative and quantitative e¤ects (seeTable (3)). Shocks of similar magnitude applied to economies with more severe moral hazard issues generate similar quantitative results.
If the adjustment process echoes the one described on the empire-building experiments, some of its underlying mechanisms are speci…c to the tunneling friction. To be concrete, consider a positive shock to the monitoring technology due to a rise in M . The …nanciers will …nd it optimal to reward more generously monitoring agents by giving them a greater share of the company (f ) and at the same time to reduce the managers'equity stake (m). Overall, this reshu-ing implies that the …nanciers retain a larger fraction of the company (a). Monitoring agents, lured by induced by the large stake in the company, exert greater monitoring e¤ort which would make more di¢ cult for managers to abscond pro…ts. Nevertheless because managers are now entitled at a smaller portion of the …rms pro…ts, they are less relucted in trying to abscond pro…ts. The variation of the quota concealed by the managers is ambiguous because two competing forces tend to o¤set one another. It is not di¢ cult to produce situations where the reduction of the managers'quota is large or small enough so that goes up rather then down. We …nd that the variation of is dwarfed by that of the tunneling parameter (1 ).
Long run
In this section, we …rst compare the patterns of development of an economy that su¤ers from an empire-building friction with those of a frictionless economy. In Figure ( ??) the trajectories of the economy with (without) friction are represented by continuous (dashed) lines. The two economies are in the same initial position x 0 . This starting point is chosen to be small enough relative to the steady state so that both economies go through three stages of development. At …rst, both economies simply produce the …nal good using an exogenously given variety of intermediate goods.
The state of technology does not improve and there is no entry. Speci…cally, equations (26) and (27) hold as inequalities because both the return to entry and the return to in-house investment are too small relative to the discount rate. Hence, the whole net output is consumed. In this phase, therefore, the only source of dynamics is the enlargement of the population that causes a gradual increase of …rm size x and thereby of the pro…tability of …rms. As the (quality-adjusted) gross pro…t rate rises, at a certain point entry becomes pro…table. The trigger point is reached …rst in the frictionless economy. Indeed, for a given size of the …rm -which is identical in the two economies during the …rst phase of development -in the economy without frictions pro…ts tend to be higher; hence, the earlier entry. 11 Afterwards, the paths of development of the two economies are no longer the same. The delay in turning on entry in the economy with frictions implies that In the second phase of development, incumbent …rms do not yet invest in innovation because it is not pro…table to do so -formally, the right-hand-side of equation (26) is smaller that the righthand-side of equation (27) . Because the …rms that populate the frictionless economy are of smaller size, their rate of return on innovation is systematically lower than in the economy with frictions. Consequently, the frictionless economy entering the innovation phase of development (third phase) later that the economy with frictions, and has a relatively poorer innovation performance even when innovation is pro…table in both economies. In brief, the frictionless economy grows at a faster pace in the second phase (endogenous entry), but in the long run it is outpaced in terms of growth by the economy with frictions, which has a positive bias towards in-house investment because of the managers'empire-building motive that causes them to price more aggressively. In the current experiment, the long-run e¤ect slightly dominates so that the welfare of the economy with frictions, evaluated at the starting position, is about 0.9% greater than that of the frictionless economy.
In a second experiment, we compare the transition paths of two economies characterized by a di¤erent monitoring e¢ ciency M and with no empire-building frictions. Table ( The key variable that explains the di¤erent transitional experiences of the two economies is , namely the size of the …rms' pro…ts that remains in the hands of dispersed shareholders, net of the share subtracted by the managers. Because is bigger in the more e¢ cient economy, entry occurs earlier, and thereafter is systematically more intense. As a result, …rms'size is always smaller, which explains the relatively more modest innovation performance of incumbent …rms. Despite these di¤erences in industry structure, our calculations suggest that the two economies enjoy about the same level of welfare, evaluated from the initial viewpoint: the more e¢ cient economy, with its greater size of minority shareholders, bene…ts relatively more on the variety dimension, whereas the alternative economy reaps relatively more bene…ts from the faster pace at which intermediate inputs are improved. As with the previous experiment, during the transition neither economy systematically outperforms the other with respect to the per capita output growth rate. 
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of …nancial market imperfections, in the form of corporate governance frictions, on growth and industrial structure. Following prior literature, we have posited two forms of frictions: an empire building problem, such that managers enjoy private bene…ts from their …rms' size, and a tunneling issue, such that managers can divert resources from …rms. We have also posited that, though majority shareholders (…rm founders) can monitor and discourage managers' tunneling activities, they cannot commit to monitoring. The design of monitoring incentives for majority shareholders allows them to extract rents, compounding managers'tunneling activities. The analysis reveals that both corporate governance frictions examined tend to increase the concentration of the market structure and depress the entry rate of new …rms. However, we have also uncovered mechanisms through which the governance issues stimulate both production and innovation of incumbent …rms. The empire building friction "corrects"the standard monopoly price distortion that results in a lower than Pareto optimal level of production. Delegating the production power to managers who have a bias for a larger production, this classic static distortion is partly muted. The correction of the static distortion has also long run repercussions through the rate of returns on innovation. Because the cost of development a technology is independent of the amount of production, the greater this is, the higher is the return on innovation. Moral hazard issues about the governance of the …rm by making relatively more costly from the point of view of the …nancier the start-up of a …rm, also tend to depress the entry rate and to generate larger …rms relatively more engaged in innovation. In this case it is the lower return entry that pushes resources into vertical innovation. We quanti…ed the relative importance of the forces that lead to an acceleration or a deceleration of the rate of the entry and of the innovation rate through a number of experiments. These also allowed us to make an educated guess of the likely welfare consequences of correcting corporate frictions. We concluded that the positive transitional welfare e¤ects associated with the acceleration in …rms' entry rate can be dumped down by the slower innovation rate. When the friction to be corrected is the empire building one, the monopolistic price distortion makes it more unlikely for the positive transitional welfare e¤ects to prevail. The analysis leaves interesting questions open for future research. The paper does not make explicit the conditions on the supply side of the …nancial market that could exacerbate or alleviate corporate governance issues. However, it is often argued that lax credit policies of …nancial institutions have allowed large businesses to pursue empire building objectives. Furthermore, such policies, and the resulting …rm leverage build up, have allegedly in ‡uenced managers' ability to divert resources from …rms. Thus, explicitly accounting for the role of …nancial institutions could yield important insights into the relation between corporate governance and growth. We leave this and other issues for future research.
Finally, one could extend the analysis by comparing the short and long run consequences corporate frictions in di¤erent industrial environments -for instance by allowing outsiders to challenge incumbent …rms. 
Proof of Proposition 2
When n > 0 assets market equilibrium requires
which says that the wealth ratio A=Y is constant. This result and the saving schedule (3) allow us to rewrite the household budget (2) as the following unstable di¤erential equation in c C=Y
P . This di¤erential equation indicates that the C=Y ratio has a unique steady state. In addition, becasue & > 0 it is also unstable, implying that an initial condition di¤erent form the steady state value will result in a tendency for the ratio to accelerate or decelarate and eventually violate the transversaility condition. Therefore the equilibrium c must jumpt immediately to the constant value
which is the bottom line of (28). When n = 0 assets market equilibrium still requires A = N V 1 1 but it is no longer true that N V = P = (1 f m ) Y since by de…nition the free-entry condition does not hold. This means that the wealth ratio A=Y is not constant. However, the relation
holds, since it is the arbitrage condition on equity holding that characterizes the value of an existing …rm regardless of how it came into existence in the …rst place. Imposing symmetry and inserting (8), the expression above for the return to equity, and (42) into the household budget (2) yields
The de…nition of x allows us to rewrite this expression as the top line of (28).
Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the expressions for the returns to quality and variety innovation (entry), reproduced here for convenience r Z = (P 1) P 
Proposition 2 says that c is constant when there is entry, i.e., when n > 0, and that in such a case the return to saving (3) becomes r = + _ Y =Y . Therefore, we can use the expression for the return to entry (44) and the de…nition of x in (25) to obtain n = Combining this expression with the return to quality (43) yields
Combining this expression with the rate of entry in (45) and solving for z yields (32) in the text of the proposition. Substituting (32) back into (45) yields (33) in the text of the proposition.
With these expressions in hand, we focus on the thresholds. The de…nition of …rm size (25) and the reduced-form production function (24) yield
Suppose that the threshold for entry is smaller than the threshold for quality innovation. Then n (x) > 0 for 0 @ P 1 + z 
:
Assumption (29) in the text of the proposition guarantees that this value is …nite. On the other hand, z (x) > 0 for This equation has always a …nite solution x Z and thus we do not need a condition equivalent to (29) . The assumption z (x N ) = (P 1) P moreover, ensures that x N < x Z because it says that at x N the value of z that agents would need to choose to equalize returns is negative. The non-negativity constraint thus binds and agents choose z = 0. This is assumption (30) in the text of the proposition.
To understand wheteher the solution just found is a stable Nash Equilibrium, we use (45) to rewrite (44) as r N = Given x, an equilibrium with both variety and quality innovation -that is stable in the Nash sense that agents have no incentives to deviate from it -exists if in the (z; r) space this line intersects the line given by (43) from below. This requires the the line just derived is positively sloped, that is, that 1 > = P 1 1 x for x > x Z . A su¢ cient condition for this to be true is 1 > = P 1 1 x N , which is assumption (31) in the text of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4
For x x N < x Z we have _ x=x = and the economy crosses the threshold for entry in …nite time. For x N < x < x Z we have, after rearranging terms,
0 @ (P 1)
The economy, therefore, crosses the threshold for quality innovation in …nite time since …rm profitability is still growing at x = x Z in light of assumption (35) . To guarantee that a solution (x) = 0 exists, we assume 
:
Using (33), we write the law of motion of x as:
Using (32), after some algebra, we rewrite this expression as
This di¤erential equation is linear if we approximate and the solution x (t) = x 0 e t + x 1 e t :
To compute the utility ‡ow we proceed in three steps. For simplicity we omit time arguments unless necessary. Consider …rst
Then log C L = log + log N 0 + log N N 0 + log Z:
From the de…nition of x we have
Then, recalling our assumptions on population dynamics, we have log C L = log + log N 0 + 1 log x 0 x L L 0 + log Z = log + log N 0 + 1 log L 0 e t L 0 + 1 log x 0 x + log Z = log + log N 0 + 1 t 1 log x x 0 + log Z:
Also, we approximate z = (P 1) P Approximating the log, we can write log x (t) x 0 = log 1 + x (t)
These results yield, after rearranging terms, log C L = log + log N 0 + log Z 0
Without loss of generality we set log N 0 + log Z 0 = 0:
This is just a normalization that does not a¤ect the results. We then substitute the expression derived above into the welfare functional and integrate to obtain
which is the level of welfare associated to the transition from a generic initial condition x 0 .
